Iaanzars 1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 2 3 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 4 V. 18 Cr. 177 (JMF) 5 SHMUEL ZARZAR, 6 Defendant. Sentence -----x 7 8 New York, New York October 10, 2018 9 3:45 p.m. 10 Before: 11 HON. JESSE M. FURMAN, 12 District Judge 13 14 APPEARANCES GEOFFREY S. BERMAN 15 United States Attorney for the 16 Southern District of New York BY: ELINOR L. TARLOW 17 Assistant United States Attorney 18 SABRINA SHROFF Attorney for Defendant 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

(Case called)

MS. TARLOW: Good afternoon, your Honor. Elinor Tarlow, for the government.

THE COURT: Good afternoon, Ms. Tarlow.

MS. SHROFF: Good afternoon, your Honor.

On behalf of Mr. Zarzar, Federal Defenders of New York, by Sabrina Shroff. I am standing up for my colleague Annalisa Miron, who is out of the office on extended leave.

THE COURT: Good afternoon to you.

Good afternoon, Mr. Zarzar.

THE DEFENDANT: Good afternoon.

THE COURT: We are here for purposes of sentencing. In preparation for today's proceeding, I have reviewed the presentence report, dated September 17, 2018.

I have also received and reviewed the following additional submissions: The defendant's submission dated September 27, 2018, as well as the attachments to that submission, including a forensic psychological report and letter from, I think it's a Dr. Termini, a letter from a licensed social worker at Federal Defenders, a letter from the defendant, letters from various family members, including his mother, grandmother, and siblings, and a letter from a former employer; and the government's submission dated October 3, 2018.

Have the parties received unredacted versions and

copies of each of the other's submissions.

MS. TARLOW: Yes, your Honor.

MS. SHROFF: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Are there any additional submissions that I should have received?

MS. TARLOW: Not from the government, your Honor.

THE COURT: Anything else?

MS. SHROFF: No, your Honor. But I was just told a couple of minutes ago that the government intends to have a person speak at sentencing, and I would ask the Court to allow me to be heard on that right now.

THE COURT: OK. Well, that's a separate matter that we'll get to in a moment. But there are no other submissions --

MS. SHROFF: No.

THE COURT: -- for present purposes?

Let me comment on the proposed redactions for a moment.

Two things. One is a fairly technical one.

Ms. Shroff, I don't know if you're the one who prepared the redactions, and this may be just because of the way in which I handle things and read things, but the way that your office I think routinely does this and uses the redaction tool on Adobe to highlight the portions that have been redacted in the publicly filed version, the problem is that is not consistent

with my rules, and it doesn't actually enable me to view them very easily. So I would ask that you get the word out in your office to make sure that you actually do look at my rules and follow them; namely, by submitting it with the highlighter tool rather than the redaction tool and that you do that without my staff having to follow up and request it from you, just to make sure that I can review things in a timely fashion.

All right?

MS. SHROFF: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Now, more immediately and perhaps substantively, I don't think that the vast majority of the proposed redactions are proper. As I understand it, I mean, the vast majority of them pertain to the defendant's history of drug use and drug abuse, and I think that is sort of the central argument that is being made for leniency here, at least one of the principal ones. In that regard I think the interest in public disclosure outweighs any privacy interest of the defendant with respect to that.

So, to the extent that you have redacted information concerning his history of drug use, I think it should be unredacted. There's other material, obviously addresses of those who sent the letters, and then some information concerning Mr. Zarzar's family history and background that I think would be appropriate to keep redacted because there are privacy interests of third parties involved there and then the

names, for example, of the entities where his former employer has worked or does work. Those I think can remain redacted, but the drug use information I think should be unredacted.

So if by let's say Monday you can revise your redactions and submit them in accordance with my rules and in highlighted fashion to indicate what remains redacted, I will take a look at it. If I have any problem with what you have resubmitted, I will let you know. But hopefully you can adhere to what I just described as the dividing line.

All right?

MS. SHROFF: Sure.

THE COURT: Thank you.

All right. Ms. Tarlow, I was going to ask if the government has advised any victim of rights under the Crime Victim Rights Act and if there was anyone present here on behalf of the victim or victim him or herself. Perhaps that gets to the issue that Ms. Shroff alluded to a moment ago.

So?

MS. TARLOW: Yes, your Honor, there are two family members of the victim present in the courtroom today. One of them may want to speak at a later point at sentencing.

THE COURT: All right. Ms. Shroff?

MS. SHROFF: Is that notice? Do you want me to address the argument, your Honor?

THE COURT: With respect to whether they should be

allowed to speak or --

MS. SHROFF: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Sure. Why not.

MS. SHROFF: I don't mean to be disrespectful to anybody who is in the audience. Did you want me to do it at sidebar?

THE COURT: I don't know what you're planning to say.

I would think that it's really a legal question.

MS. SHROFF: That's correct, your Honor.

THE COURT: In that regard I would think that you could state it in open court, but go ahead.

MS. SHROFF: Your Honor, I literally learned of this less than two minutes ago, but I do not believe that the individuals being proffered to the Court properly fall within the definitional section of 18 U.S.C.3771. The definitional section or the authorizing section defines the victim as somebody who's directly and proximately harmed by the committed conduct. The committed conduct here, the conduct that Mr. Zarzar pled to and as reflected in the PSR is the receipt of child pornography.

For that particular conduct and for that particular crime, the victim in this case whose parents are in court was not, in fact, contacted. The victim was never asked for a photograph, and the victim was never proximately or directly impacted by this conduct.

By the time that Mr. Zarzar requested any attempted receipt or photographs, the person that was being contacted by Mr. Zarzar was not in fact a 12-year-old but the undercover officer. For that reason, the victim who is directly and proximately impacted is not the person whose parents are in court.

Additionally, your Honor, if I could ask the Court to take a look at the final PSR, which contains the recommendation section, specifically paragraph 14. The probation officer, who is a very experienced probation officer in this case, Mr. Ross Kapitansky, had more than one effort at having reached out and was told that, and I quote, that his daughter had learned a lesson and was not terribly impacted by text exchanges. That was the conduct to which she was subject, since that is not the conduct to which Mr. Zarzar pled, again, the parents are not properly within the definitional section of the crime victims act.

THE COURT: Ms. Tarlow, your response and your thoughts.

MS. TARLOW: Yes, your Honor.

This is the first I am hearing of this argument, but at first blush I would say this may be a moot matter. I don't know again if the family member would like to speak. If the family member does want to speak, I would just note for your Honor that, although paragraph 14 says the victim was not

terribly impacted, there was, of course, some impact as we have alleged in our --

THE COURT: Let me put that argument to the side. I think that paragraph doesn't cut either way with respect to whether anyone who wishes to speak should be allowed to speak or has a right to speak. I think the more salient question is whether the parents have a right to speak under the Crime Victim Rights Act.

On that I confess I don't know the law insofar as by the time the actual criminal offense was committed here the person involved on the other end was not actually the minor any longer, but an undercover. Having said that, the defendant believed that person would be the minor, and in that regard was sort of the intended victim. I just don't know what the law is on that.

So, my concern is that to comply with the law, the parents may have the right to speak, and in that regard I would be committing error if I don't let them; but if they don't have the right to speak, I might be committing error to let them speak. Maybe we should find out if they wish to, and then we can find out whether it's necessary to drill down and get to the bottom of that, in which case we can discuss how to do that.

MS. TARLOW: Yes, your Honor.

May I have a moment?

THE COURT: You may.

(Pause)

MS. TARLOW: After conferring with the family member of the victim, they have decided not to speak.

THE COURT: Then it's a moot point, and we can proceed from there.

All right. I do want to make clear if this changes anything you can let Ms. Tarlow know and signal somehow. I'm prepared to figure out whether you do have the right to speak. In that regard if you do want to speak, I don't want you to be deterred by the discussion that just happened.

There are just different rights at stake here, and I want to make sure I both get them right and strike the right balance to the extent I even have discretion in the matter.

The bottom line is I'm happy to look into it if there's any interest, but if there isn't I think we can proceed.

Ms. Shroff?

MS. SHROFF: Your Honor, our argument was last minute only because we learned two minutes ago. Obviously, if the Court thinks the sentencing should be adjourned so that everybody has time, we have no objection. But it's not an argument I knew of. I only learned of this literally two minutes before.

THE COURT: I understand, and I do not fault you for that. For that matter I don't know if Ms. Tarlow knew

beforehand that this might be an issue, but suffice it to say I would be prepared to adjourn if the gentleman here did wish to speak in order to figure out whether that is the right course of action, and that's more or less what I was saying a moment ago. But, absent an indication that there is a desire to speak, I think we can proceed today.

So, for now, I will at least assume that we can proceed.

On that score, Ms. Shroff, have you read the presentence report?

MS. SHROFF: I read the presentence report, your Honor, both the draft and the final version.

THE COURT: Have you discussed it with Mr. Zarzar?

MS. SHROFF: I have.

THE COURT: Mr. Zarzar, have you read the presentence report?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I have.

THE COURT: Have you discussed it with your lawyers?

THE DEFENDANT: I have.

THE COURT: Did you have enough time to go over the report with them, to discuss any mistakes in the report and anything that you would wish to bring to my attention in connection with your sentencing?

THE DEFENDANT: I have.

THE COURT: Keep your voice up, please, so that we can

all hear you.

Ms. Shroff, putting aside the guidelines for a moment, any objections to the factual accuracy of the presentence report?

MS. SHROFF: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: Ms. Tarlow, have you reviewed the presentence report?

MS. TARLOW: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Any objections to the factual accuracy of the report?

MS. TARLOW: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: Hearing no objections, I will adopt the factual recitations set forth in the presentence report, which will be made part of the record in this matter and kept under seal. If an appeal is taken, counsel on appeal may have access to the sealed report without further application to me.

As counsel know, I'm not bound by the sentencing guidelines, but I do have to consider the applicable guidelines range, and I must accurately calculate that range in the first instance. Here the parties entered a stipulation with respect to the calculation of the guidelines range. Am I correct that the probation department's calculation is consistent with the parties' calculation?

MS. TARLOW: Yes, your Honor.

MS. SHROFF: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: So, based on the parties' agreement, and the absence of any objection and my own independent evaluation of the sentencing guidelines, I accept and adopt the guidelines calculation set forth in the presentence report. That is, using the November 2016 edition of the guidelines, I find that the total offense level is 31, the criminal history category is I, the guidelines range is 108 to 135 months' imprisonment, and the fine range is 30,000 to 250,000 dollars.

In the plea agreement, both sides agreed not to seek a departure from the guidelines sentence and guidelines range, is that correct?

MS. TARLOW: Yes, your Honor.

MS. SHROFF: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: I have, nevertheless, considered whether there is an appropriate basis for a departure that is distinct from what has come to be known as variance pursuant to Section 3553(a), and I do not find that there are grounds for a departure.

Having settled all that, I will hear first from the government and then from Ms. Shroff and from Mr. Zarzar if he wishes to say anything and before proceeding to sentencing.

Ms. Tarlow.

MS. TARLOW: Yes, your Honor.

For the reasons set forth in our submission, we submit that a sentence above the mandatory minimum and a significant

term of imprisonment would be appropriate in this matter, primarily to reflect the seriousness of the defendant's offense and to afford adequate deterrence to other individuals who are similarly situated.

First, with respect to the defendant's offense conduct in this matter, as your Honor is aware, the defendant repeatedly sent messages to an undercover law enforcement office who was assuming the identity of the victim for photographs in which the victim would be, quote, basically naked because they were, quote, going to see each other naked anyways.

The defendant directed the victim to lift up her shirt to show him her belly. When the undercover official refused, acting as the victim, the defendant continued to request those photographs, stating that the victim would be, quote, in such trouble if you go to sleep without sending me the pic.

But the defendant didn't just attempt to possess child pornography, and he didn't just engage in mere communications behind the safety of a computer or phone. The defendant discussed engaging in sexual activities with a 12-year-old child who lived in his neighborhood or who he believed was a 12-year-old child who lived in his neighborhood, and he took concrete actions. He persistently told the victim and the undercover official that he wanted to meet in person. Despite the refusals, the defendant actually went to the victim's

school, where he waited outside for several hours and was observed doing so by law enforcement officials.

He attempted to give the victim a phone so that his conversations could not be detected by her parents. When the defendant did not see the victim at her school where he had placed the phone, he then asked to meet her at her home.

Despite the undercover's refusals to provide the defendant with the victim's home address, the defendant said that he then searched online and found the victim's home address. When the victim finally agreed to meet with the defendant, again, the undercover official acting as the victim, the defendant described explicit sexual interactions that he wanted to have, and he expressed pleasure at the thought that he would be the first individual to engage in such conduct with the victim.

He then traveled from Brooklyn to Manhattan in order to meet with the victim, presumably to engage in the sexual activities that he had discussed with her a few days earlier. That conduct spanned several months, despite the defendant knowing that his victim was a minor or believing that she was a minor, that she was 12 years old, and his actions were not the product of rash decision making or a momentary lapse in judgment. They constituted a sustained pattern of conduct over several months, during which time, as I just said, he was able to have a cell phone, devise a plan to provide the victim with

a cell phone and research and find the victim's home address.

For that entire period he never disengaged, he never had a moment of clarity of the inappropriateness of his actions.

With respect to general deterrence, as your Honor is well aware these kinds of crimes have very long lasting and devastating effect on their victims. Although law enforcement intervened before the defendant had any sexual conduct with an actual victim, he did pose a significant threat to her. I mentioned he stood outside of her school for several hours. He encouraged the victim — and this was when he was actually speaking to the 12-year-old — to attempt to conceal her conduct by encouraging her disobey her parent's instructions to avoid strangers and by suggesting that the victim use a different phone to communicate with him.

Very briefly, just to respond to a few of the defendant's points noting reasons for judicial leniency, as we stated in our submission, we don't believe that the defendant's abuse of narcotics means that the defendant is any less culpable or in any way justifies his conduct.

The actions that he took endangered the welfare of a 12-year-old child who lived in his neighborhood. He knew where the child went to school. He waited outside the victim's school. He took steps to determine where the victim lived. He attempted to have the victim send pornographic images to him,

and he discussed sexual activities that he intended to engage in with the victim.

There is a real danger that the defendant may return to using substances upon his release, and he may return to similar conduct. Over the last five years he struggled with addiction. He's been arrested on four occasions for narcotics offenses. Some of those are pending.

During that period he cycled through medical treatment. He recognized at one point in time the seriousness of his substance abuse issues, he attempted to detox on his own, but he failed, and he returned to abusing substances. As he noted in his submission, when his insurance lapsed, he then increased his intake of opiates and turned to using heroin.

Just as a final point, the defendant claims that he would not return to conduct similar to the instant offense.

I just want to highlight for your Honor, as we did in our submission, that the Dr. Termini concluded that the defendant "is not sexually attracted to minors aged 13 or younger, but has a primary attraction to females aged 14 to 17."

The government is troubled by that fact for a variety of reasons, including if the defendant returns to using substances that he might be susceptible to acting on those attractions. Your Honor, for all those reasons, we suggest that a sentence, a significant term of imprisonment above the

mandatory minimum would be appropriate in this matter.

THE COURT: Let me ask a couple of specific questions if I might.

First, notwithstanding what you just said, I take it from your sentencing submission that you do believe that a below-guidelines sentence would not be inappropriate or would be unreasonable, is that correct?

MS. TARLOW: Yes, your Honor. We primarily based our determination on the fact that there is no charged conduct of similar type of offenses. The government did a review of the defendant's e-mail account and did not find evidence of any kind of similar conduct, including possession of child pornography or enticement of minors, as well as the defendant's characteristics and history prior to abusing narcotics and his childhood and own record.

THE COURT: Do you want to respond to the defendant's arguments with respect to the guidelines here?

Obviously, the guideline has been the subject of some judicial attention and criticism, but I don't know whether or to what extent that applies in this particular case.

MS. TARLOW: Right. We don't take a position as a general matter with respect to the appropriateness of the guidelines for these types of crimes.

THE COURT: All right.

Then two other questions. Paragraph 31 of the

presentence report, which pertains to a prior conviction, indicates that the defendant was found to be in possession of not just drugs on that occasion, but various police paraphernalia.

Do you know what the story is with that?

MS. TARLOW: I don't, your Honor. I don't have additional context to that offense.

THE COURT: Lastly, I am not sure how much or whether this even matters, but was the girl involved in the first instance, was she actually 12? I know that the defendant claims that she initially said she was 17. Do you know what her true age is or was at the time?

MS. TARLOW: She was 12 years old, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

Ms. Shroff, I've read all of your submissions, including the forensic psychological report and letters, so you don't need to repeat what you have already told me, but give me your thoughts.

MS. SHROFF: So I just want to correct or at least amplify one argument that the government made, that they were disturbed by what Mr. Zarzar told Dr. Termini. If the Court could take just take a look at page 14 of Dr. Termini's report.

THE COURT: Could you keep your voice up and speak into the microphone, please.

MS. SHROFF: Sure.

It's Exhibit A. I just want to make sure — because the government did not quote Dr. Termini in her entirety — the Court has what she says. "The objective results of psychosocial testing reveal that Mr. Zarzar is not sexually attracted to minors aged 13 or younger. He has a primary attraction to females aged 14 to 17, followed by adult females, which is a normal profile for a heterosexual male, and may be reflective of the age group that he is emotionally best able to identify with."

That is the entirety of the text that Dr. Termini wrote for the government, the defense, and the Court. So it would be inaccurate for the government to be troubled by Mr. Zarzar's very truthful statement to the doctor who was evaluating him, because he falls squarely within the normal psychological profile. Although none of us may want to have that profile front and center, as Dr. Termini notes that is a normal profile and he does not fall in an aberrant range.

THE COURT: You are telling me that it is a normal profile for somebody in his 30s to be attracted to 14-year-old girls?

MS. SHROFF: I am not saying that. I'm telling you what Dr. Termini said, and what Dr. Termini says is that that would be a normal profile for somebody if he were -- I think what she's saying is that it falls within the normal range of when an average group of men are tested, and that's what their

reflexes say. So he would fall within the norm.

I'm not suggesting to you that that is what Mr. Zarzar actually feels or what Mr. Zarzar would actually act on. I think what Dr. Termini is saying is if she administered the test to a hundred people of the same age group, that's the test result, and that is what it would show. That is what I am trying to say.

THE COURT: All right. Go ahead.

MS. SHROFF: I also want to take a step back and explain to the Court that Mr. Zarzar does not in any way say he's not responsible for his conduct because of his addiction. I don't think that Mr. Zarzar has ever said that in his letters, and certainly not in the submission that has been set forth to the Court.

Government counsel did make a statement recently when they said that Mr. Zarzar did not have a moment of clarity. That is in fact true. He didn't have a moment of clarity. If you walk back not just in terms of the offense conduct in this case but also walk into back into Mr. Zarzar's chronological life, it is truly unfortunate. It's a confluence of some very unfortunate events that bring him before you today.

As the government said, there's nothing in his past, not on his computers, not on his e-mail, not in his home, nowhere is there any indication of this very aberrant conduct. Nothing.

He does not have pornography on any of his devices.

He had a terrible, terrible break. The break was precipitated by so many things that were going on for him. There is no doubt he had a horrible childhood. That is compounded by the lack of intervention, and unfortunately many a parent who says a child will grow out of it.

He gets his life together. He has a girlfriend. He finally gets a job. He finally gets into a union. Through no fault of his, he's literally in an accident, an accident that completely annihilates almost everything that could have gone right for him.

This is not a man who turned to drugs because he was weak. This is not a person who went and got high because it was fun. This is a person about whom books are written now, movies are made, the terrible opioid addiction. The addiction is just as bad when it's a defendant who's before you as opposed to, you know, the person to whom that opioid is being sold, and when I stand next to the person who sold it.

Mr. Zarzar, it's really unfortunate that he was hit in an accident, that he did get prescribed opioids, and for whatever inherent weakness he has, he could not deal with his pain without this continued addiction on drugs.

That's what brought Mr. Zarzar to almost the brink. Even through all that period he never did anything remotely reflecting the conduct in this case. I think he truly snapped

when he saw the woman that he loved, whom he broke up with because he could no longer support her and he thought he was so far gone that it would be unfair to keep him engaged to him, with another man.

Also, the conduct, how this conduct starts, he doesn't go looking for a young girl. It happens upon him. Should he have exercised better judgment? Absolutely. Should he have stopped when he figured out she was 12 and not 17 as she said? Of course. Does it lessen his conduct that all of these bad things happened to him? No.

But that's why he pled guilty, and that's why he has a mandatory minimum of 60 months. 60 months is not a short sentence. 60 months is not an insignificant sentence.

But, look, the government is an advocate for its position. I am certainly hopefully an advocate for Mr. Zarzar.

The only objective person in this room other than this Court is the probation officer. The probation officer here,

Mr. Ross Kapitansky, is a seasoned, thoughtful probation

officer. I reread his recommendation section several times,

and he recommends a 60-month sentence here.

He did not find Mr. Zarzar to be excusing his conduct. He did not say Mr. Zarzar was pretending or malingering. He did not say Mr. Zarzar deserves no time. If the Court will recall your own experience with Mr. Kapitansky -- I certainly recall mine -- he is certainly a middle-of-the-road probation

officer. His recommendation should count far more than my advocacy. His recommendation was for 60 months. I ask the Court to focus on the reasons why Mr. Kapitansky recommended such a sentence.

I just want to say one final word about Mr. Zarzar. I do not know him well because I'm standing up for my colleague, but Mr. Zarzar has made a concerted effort to show the Court that he is a different person. MCC is full of drugs; Valhalla is full of drugs. He has not once relapsed. He has worked with the pretrial and with the paralegal in our office who's here in Court today. He's worked with the social worker who works not just with him but also works with his family, because the only way to confront addiction is to work with those who are supporting Mr. Zarzar, and that includes his mother, who, as the probation officer notes, did not fully realize the depth of his addiction, and we're hopeful that she will continue working with Mr. Angel Vasquez, who is the social worker, and she will be well prepared over the next four years to help Mr. Zarzar when he's released.

He's not making a promise to you that nothing will go wrong. I think he has worked really hard to show you that he is serious about changing and that he's serious about staying sober. If there's one thing that is clear from his profile, it is that in the 31 years he has been here, this is the only time he has ever engaged in this type of conduct.

The government routinely falls back on other evidence to support what they think is a person's proclivity. If you fall back on it in this case, you will see there is none. I do not think Mr. Zarzar will ever repeat this conduct because I do not think he would have done it but for the very bad space that he was in, and I do believe that he will have moments of clarity upon his release.

60 months is a long time, your Honor, and I ask you to impose the sentence recommended by the department of probation in this case, with the concomitant five years of supervised release, which will ensure supervision, which will ensure that it comports and that it complies.

Finally, he will be required to register as a sex offender. That registration will also severely curtail all of his freedoms and certainly give him a deep, deep amount of supervision.

I know I've spoken a little bit too long, but thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you, Ms. Shroff.

Mr. Zarzar, is there anything that you wish to say before I sentence you?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes. Should I stand?

THE COURT: Why don't you stay seated so that you can speak into the microphone please. Just speak loudly and clearly and slowly.

THE DEFENDANT: I just want you to know that the person that's sitting here today, I still look back at these charges that are brought and I can't understand how I -- I am not the same person who was charged with these charges.

My entire life I have been through many things, but I never -- I was always a person who was trying hard, always trying to achieve, to aspire to do something, to be someone to do something, to work to become more and better and better than what I am.

Getting into drugs was something that I never in my life ever thought would happen to me. I look at the picture that — today was the first time I saw the picture of what I looked like when he got arrested in color. And I'm sorry, but it's just — I can't — I can't — it just doesn't register in my head.

I have been locked up now for ten months now. I have been locked up and I have been nonstop trying to just be back trying to be a normal person again, a person who's not addicted, a person who is not doing things that are not, that are not normal to do.

As soon as I got myself healthy again, I got a job in MCC. I started working in the kitchen. I took courses in the educational department to occupy my other time, took a course working as a -- what do you call it? A suicide watch inmate companion, to help other people, to keep myself busy. I wanted

to do work as an electrician in MCC because that's what I'm good at, but that wasn't available for some reason pretrial.

Every day I wake up and I make sure that I will not in any chance have any opportunity to get into a position where I will use drugs, even though there is drugs around me. I know that I did something wrong and I'm not making excuses for it, and I know that I need to be punished.

Moving forward I just want to be a better person and make sure that I stay out of this kind of trouble again, stay away from drugs. Unfortunately in the Jewish community being addicted to drugs is a very taboo subject. It is something that nobody wants to address.

Hopefully one day after I get out and I get my life back on track and I become a productive member of society once again I can maybe try to make a difference in that, because what I went through is not something that I would wish on my worst enemy.

I hope that I can help make one day, if possible, after I help myself, now that I am going to be doing time, I am going to be taking whatever programs I can take to help myself stay and better myself and not get into a position where drugs become an issue for me again. I am aware that even taking -- I know that taking RDAP isn't going to get me a time reduction. I'm still going to do it just so I can help myself.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much,

Mr. Zarzar.

I want to just give the gentleman who is here an opportunity to indicate if he has reconsidered and would like to address me, in which case I'm prepared to adjourn.

Otherwise, I'm prepared to proceed.

All right. He's shaking his head no, so I will proceed.

Counsel, is there any reason why sentence should not be imposed at this time?

MS. TARLOW: No, your Honor.

MS. SHROFF: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: In imposing sentence I'm required to consider the factors set forth in Title 18, United States Code, Section 3553(a).

In the interest of time, I am not going to recite them at length, but suffice it to say that I have and will consider all of them, including the sentencing guidelines range, which I have found to be 108 to 135 months' imprisonment, and the purposes of sentencing set forth in subsection (a)(2) of the statute. Ultimately, I'm required to impose a sentence that is sufficient, but no greater than necessary to comply with the purposes of sentencing set forth in subsection (2) of the statute.

Now, like the government, I do think that there are reasons to vary from the guidelines range and impose a

below-guidelines range here. Those include the defendant's history and characteristics, including what was clearly a very difficult childhood and to some extent the history of the mental health and substance abuse problems.

I also think that the steps that Mr. Zarzar has taken while in custody are commendable. I commend you for taking them and trying to get your life back on track in the ways that you've described. Even if, for example, you don't qualify for credit through the RDAP program, I think it certainly is in your interest to pursue any and all opportunities of that sort that are presented to you.

Having said that, I do think a substantial sentence is warranted here for a number of reasons. The offense here and the offense conduct is, to use the probation officer's term, vile and despicable. I don't think anybody should think otherwise. Nor was it a single solitary act. It was conduct that took place over a two-month period that involved a fair bit of planning and calculation. That includes the effort to get the victim a phone, to track down her home address, and to take steps to locate her and really stalk her.

At the end of the day, we are talking about a 12-year-old girl. I don't know whether she in person looks closer to 17 in a way that might have given the defendant some reason to believe that claim initially, but certainly he harbored no illusions about her age during the course of the

conduct that I just described, and that is abhorrent behavior and behavior that warrants substantial punishment.

On top of that, I do recognize the portion of the sentence that Ms. Tarlow omitted when she referenced the apportionment of the forensic report, but I have to say that I too was struck by the fact that a report commissioned and submitted by the defendant himself stated that his primary attraction was to 14 to 17-year-old girls.

I don't know if that's normal. It doesn't strike me as normal, but in a case involving a person who sought to entice a minor to engage in sexual acts in fairly egregious and explicit ways, that strikes me as a major concern.

It is not only unlawful, but it is despicable to prey upon girls of the age of 14. I am just not willing to take the chance that based on Mr. Zarzar's own attraction the defense letter says that Mr. Zarzar is "no threat to break the law again" When push comes to shove, I am just not quite as optimistic about that. I sure hope that is right.

I hope that he gets the drug treatment that he so sorely needs, that he gets the mental health treatment that he also clearly needs. Indeed, in that regard I note that some of his behavioral problems predate the 2012 accident by a number of years. Indeed, they go back to second grade as far as I can tell from the presentence report, but the bottom line is I think there is a significant danger of relapse, and in that

regard the need for both specific deterrence and a need to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant.

I hope that this is aberrant behavior, but the fact of the matter is I am just not willing to take the chance that it is, and there are reasons to be concerned.

So I will state the sentence that I intend to impose and would ask you, Mr. Zarzar, to please rise.

Mr. Zarzar, it is the judgment of this Court that you are remanded to the custody of the Bureau of Prisons for a period of 84 months, that is seven years, to be followed by a period of five years of supervised release.

During your term of supervised release, you will be subject to the following mandatory conditions:

You shall not commit another federal, state or local crime.

You shall not illegally possess a controlled substance.

You shall refrain from any unlawful use of a controlled substance and submit to one drug test within 15 days of your release on supervised release and at least two periodic drug tests thereafter as determined by probation.

You shall cooperate in the collection of DNA as directed by probation, and you must comply with the requirements of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act as directed by the probation officer, the Bureau of

Prisons, or any state sex offender registration agency in which you reside or work, are a student, or were convicted of a qualifying offense.

In addition, the standard conditions of supervised release set forth in the presentence report and in the judgment will apply.

Among other things, you shall not possess a firearm or destructive device, and you shall report to the probation office in the judicial district where you are authorized to reside within 72 hours of your release from custody.

Finally, you must meet the following special conditions:

First, you shall participate in an outpatient drug treatment program approved by the United States Probation

Office, which program may include testing to determine whether you have reverted to using drugs or alcohol.

I authorize the release of available drug treatment evaluations and reports to the substance abuse treatment provider as approved by the probation officer.

You shall be required to contribute to the cost of services rendered -- that is, to make a copayment -- in an amount determined by the probation officer based on your ability to pay or the availability of third-party payment.

You shall participate in an outpatient mental health program approved by the probation department.

You shall continue to take any prescribed medications unless otherwise instructed by your health care provider.

You shall contribute to the cost of services rendered not covered by third-party payment if you have the ability to pay.

I authorize the release of available psychological and psychiatric evaluations and reports to your health care provider.

You must participate in the computer and Internet monitoring program administered by the United States Probation Office. You must provide the probation office advance notification of any computer or computers, automated services or connected devices that will be used during your term of supervision and that can access the Internet.

The probation office is authorized to install any application as necessary to survey all activity on those computers or connected devices owned or operated by you. You may be required to pay the cost of monitoring services at the monthly rate provided by the U.S. Probation Office. The rate and payment schedule are subject to periodic adjustments by the probation office.

The probation office shall be notified via electronic transmission of impermissible or suspicious activity or communications occurring on any such computer or connected device.

Consistent with the computer monitoring policy in effect by the probation office, as triggered by impermissible suspicious activity, you must consent to and cooperate with unannounced examinations of any computer equipment owned or used by you. This examination shall include, but is not limited to, retrieval and copying of all data from the computers, connected devices, storage media, and any internal or external peripherals and may involve removal of such equipment for the purpose of conducting a more thorough inspection.

You must not have contact with the victim in this case or any member of her family. This includes any physical, visual, written, or telephonic contact with those persons.

Additionally, you must not directly cause or encourage anyone else to have such contact with the victim or members of her family.

You shall submit your person, residence, place of business, vehicle, or any property or electronic device under your control to a search on the basis that the probation officer has a reasonable belief that contraband or evidence of a violation of the conditions of supervised release may be found. That search must be conducted at a reasonable time and in a reasonable manner. Failure to submit to a search may be grounds for revocation, and you shall advise any other residents that the premises may be subject to search pursuant

to that condition.

You shall undergo a sex offense specific evaluation and participate in a sex offender treatment and/or mental health treatment program approved by the probation officer.

You shall abide by all rules, requirements, and conditions of the sex offender treatment program, including submission to polygraph testing.

You shall waive your right to confidentiality in any records for mental health assessment and treatment imposed as a consequence of this judgment to allow the probation officer to review your course of treatment and progress with the treatment provider.

You shall be required to contribute to the cost of services rendered in an amount approved by the probation officer based on your ability to pay or the availability of third-party payment. And I authorize the release of available psychological and psychiatric evaluations and reports, including the presentence report, to the sex offender treatment provider and/or mental health treatment provider.

You shall not have deliberate contact with any child under 18 years of age unless approved by the probation officer.

You shall not loiter within 100 feet of schoolyards, playgrounds, arcades, or other places primarily used by children under the age of 18.

And you shall be supervised in the district of your

1 residence.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

I am not going to impose a fine because I find that you do not have the ability to pay a fine.

I am, however, imposing the mandatory special assessment of \$100, which shall be due and payable immediately.

Does either counsel know of any legal reason why the sentence should not be imposed as stated?

MS. TARLOW: No, your Honor.

MS. SHROFF: I know of no legal reason.

THE COURT: The sentence as stated is imposed. I find that the sentence is sufficient, but no greater than necessary, to satisfy the sentencing purposes set forth in Section 3553(a)(2), including the need to promote respect for the law, to provide just punishment for the offense, to afford adequate deterrence, and to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant.

Ms. Shroff, do you have any request with respect to designation recommendation for the Bureau of Prisons?

MS. SHROFF: May I just have a moment, your Honor.

THE COURT: You may.

THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor, may I make a statement, please.

THE COURT: I'm sorry?

(Defense counsel and the defendant conferred)

MS. SHROFF: Your Honor, Mr. Zarzar wants to correct a

matter. He would like the Court to know that the statement reflected in Dr. Termini's report is inaccurate, and he wants the Court to know that.

THE COURT: Understood. You had an opportunity to speak to me and that opportunity, you availed yourself of it. So at this time I am going to say no to that question.

Ms. Shroff, any request with respect to a designation location?

MS. SHROFF: He would like to be designated at Otisville, please.

THE COURT: All right. I will recommend that he be designated to a facility as close to New York City as possible to facilitate the maintenance of ties to his family, and, if appropriate, to Otisville where, among other things, I suspect that the resources and community would provide him with religious opportunities that he might not have elsewhere.

Mr. Zarzar, I urge you to take advantage of any and all treatment programs while you are in custody that you can in the way that you described.

It's clear to me that you have any number of issues that you need to contend with, and I would urge you to take advantage of whatever is made available to you now. Certainly when you get out you're obviously required to do so, but I would urge you to take advantage of the resources and support that probation will provide to you and at least some of your

family clearly will provide to you to ensure that you don't backslide, that you do get your life on track in the way that you indicated you would like to so that you don't engage in any sort of conduct of the sort that happened here.

You obviously do have talents and strike me as somebody who could contribute to the world in the way that you have been trying while in custody. I hope that you are able to continue that and put this behind you when you have the opportunity do that.

Ms. Tarlow, there are open counts to be dismissed, is that correct?

MS. TARLOW: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: They are dismissed at this time.

Mr. Zarzar, to the extent that you have not given up your right to appeal either your guilty plea or the plea agreement you entered into in connection with your plea, you have the right to appeal. Any notice of appeal must be filed within 14 days of the entry of the judgment of conviction. If you cannot afford to pay the costs of an appeal, you may apply for leave to appeal in forma pauperis.

THE COURT: Anything else, Ms. Tarlow?

MS. TARLOW: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: Ms. Shroff.

MS. SHROFF: May I just have a moment?

THE COURT: You may.

	laanzars
1	(Defense counsel and the defendant conferred)
2	MS. SHROFF: No, your Honor. Thank you.
3	THE COURT: All right. In that case I will stay on
4	the bench, but the matter is adjourned.
5	(Adjourned)
6	
7	
8	
9	
10	
11	
12	
13	
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	